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I. INTRODUCTION
The modem practice of securities law is, in many respects, coextensive
with the practice of securities industry arbitration. In no small measure,
brokers and dealers in the securities industry have seized upon arbitration's
ability to deliver less expensive, more efficient, and authoritative
resolutions of disputes with customers than does the public court system.1
Customer agreements that do not contain boilerplate language requiring that
all disputes be submitted to arbitration are now the exception to the rule.2
As a result, "in the new era, arbitration is suddenly everywhere." 3 Just a
1 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982) (stating that "[t]he advantages of arbitration
are many: it is usually cheaper and faster than litigation")); Paul Lansing & John D.
Bailey, The Future of Punitive Damage Awards in Securities Arbitration Cases After
Mastrobuono, 8 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 201, 205-06 (1996). Lansing and Bailey discuss a
study of the benefits of arbitration in the securities industry that was commissioned by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1988. Three scholars surveyed
securities disputes in six large brokerage firms between October 1, 1997 and June 30,
1998. Sixty-six of them were resolved in litigation and 142 were resolved through
arbitration. Ultimately, they found that arbitration of securities disputes was markedly
faster and more cost efficient than the public justice system. On the average, disputes
resolved in arbitration required 434 days and $8,000 in legal fees to achieve a final
resolution, while disputants choosing the route of traditional litigation to resolve their
disputes spent, on average, $20,000 over the course of 599 days in doing so. See id.
(citing PHILip J. HOBL.N, JR., SEcuRr ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES,
CASES XXIII-12 (2d ed. 1992)).
2 See Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Debate Continues,
Disp. REsOL. J., Summer 1997, at 67, 67 (noting that the modem era is one "where
most employment contracts and securities agreements contain boilerplate language that
requires both parties to submit all disputes to arbitration. . ."); see also Harold Brown,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Realities and Remedies, 30 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 743,
745 (1997) (stating that "most stockbrokers are now governed by arbitration covenants
with each brokerage firm. Almost all brokerage firms have also inserted such arbitration
covenants in their customer retainer agreements.").
3 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of
Arbitration, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3, 6-7 & n.29 (1997) (observing that when the
Supreme Court of the United States declared that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is
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decade ago, about 2,800 securities disputes were submitted to arbitration
annually. That number has since expanded to almost 8,000. 4 Perhaps this
advent of the widespread use of arbitration can be explained, in part, by the
fact that arbitral proceedings are viewed as "[a] veritable surrogate for the
public justice system." 5
But are they? That such an extensive number of securities firms have
found their place at the arbitration table has, no doubt, been the catalyst
behind the resolution of disputes absent the formality, expense, and relative
inefficiency of traditional litigation. Nevertheless, the increase in securities
arbitration likewise has given rise to a number of questions which, at
present, remain unanswered. Foremost among them, and central to modem
securities arbitration, is whether securities arbitrators have the power and
the authority to issue punitive damages, and if so, whether such awards
must be subjected to constitutional or public policy limitations. 6 A chorus
of varying responses has been generated from several different schools of
thought, the consequence of which is stark discord among authorities. 7 In
substantive federal law, and thus that the FAA carries the force necessary to preempt
any contrary state law, see Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), the Court thereby dispensed with a number of public policy
limitations on the invocation of arbitration procedures, which in turn opened the door to
its exceedingly widespread use).
4 See Martin L. Budd, Securities Industry Arbitration-Recent Developments, in
BROKER-DEALER REGULATION, at 119, 121 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials No.
SC41, 1998). Between 8% and 10% of the cases filed for arbitration in the securities
industry are arbitrated by the American Arbitration Association (AAA), five percent are
arbitrated by self-regulatory organizations other than the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), and the NASD arbitrates the remaining 85%. These
figures, of course, make the NASD the "most important forum" for resolving securities
disputes. Id.
5 Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 3.
6 See Isham R. Jones III, Note, Exemplary Awards in Securities Arbitration: Short-
Circuited Rights to Punitive Damages, 1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 129, 129 (1995) (observing
the strong disagreements among the federal circuit courts regarding the authority of
securities arbitrators to issue punitive damages). In large part, this debate stems from
the fact that a number of commentators have considered punitive damages to be the
equivalent of "vindictive damages." See, e.g., Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 517 (1957) (stating that "[t]he terms 'punitive,'
'vindictive,' or 'exemplary' damages and 'smart money' have been interchangeably
applied to a class of money damages awarded in tort actions beyond what is needed to
'compensate' the plaintiff for his injuries").
7 Simply because the debate over punitive damages in the securities arbitration
context is a relatively new one, however, is not an indication that punitive damages in
themselves are new machinery in the law. Indeed, they have been in existence for at
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fact, the Securities Arbitration Task Force of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) prefaced its own position on the subject by
stating that "[n]o subject has generated more widespread controversy or
resulted in more polarization between investor and broker-dealer
communities than the appropriateness of punitive damages in securities
arbitration." 8
Accordingly, the purpose of this Note is to survey the role that the
issuance of punitive damages plays in the securities arbitration context. It
contends that arbitral awards of punitive damages are inconsistent with the
due process requirements of the United States Constitution. Part H traces
the historical development of a jurisprudence regarding arbitral awards of
punitive damages by securities arbitrators. Part III argues that such awards
constitute state action, and therefore, are bound by the restrictions of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part IV explores the relationship
between punitive damages and the Due Process Clause. Finally, Part V
examines and criticizes responses to the growing concern that arbitral
awards of punitive damages by securities arbitrators are out of step with the
Constitution. Furthermore, this Note argues that because constitutional due
process requirements and punitive awards in an arbitral setting have not
been reconciled, the issuance of punitive damages is inappropriate in the
securities arbitration arena.
least 4,000 years. The Code of Hammurabi, dated at c.2,000.B.C., made provisions for
the award of multiple or punitive damages in some instances. See Constantine N.
Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Tower of Babel Revisited, 18
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 574 (1991). Likewise, Hittite law, the Hindu Code of Manu,
and possibly Roman legal codes contained provisions for punitive damages. See James
B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its
Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1984). An English court first used the phrase
"exemplary damages" to describe a jury award in excess of the plaintiff's actual injury
in 1763. See id. (citing Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763)).
8 David S. Ruder, Securities Arbitration in the Public Interest: The Role of Punitive
Damages, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 69, 70 (1997) (citing ARBrrRATION PoLIcY TASK FORCE,
NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT
OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOvERNORs 35 (1996)
[hereinafter ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE]).
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II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A JURISPRUDENCE
REGARDING ARBITRAL AWARDS OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES BY SECURITIES ARBITRATORS
The modern debate over the power of a securities arbitrator's authority
to issue punitive damages begins with the decision of the New York Court
of Appeals in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.9 There it was determined, at least
so far as the law of the state of New York was concerned, that the issuance
of punitive damages does not fall within the scope of an arbitrator's
authority, even in those cases in which the parties had entered into an
arbitration agreement expressly providing for arbitral awards of punitive
damages. 10 But the question was far from settled. The Garrity decision
sparked a firestorm of debate, especially among the lower federal courts. 11
It was at long last that the Supreme Court of the United States attempted to
resolve the issue of arbitral awards of punitive damages in its decision in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.12 But this decision proved
to be of little comfort for those seeking certainty in the law of securities
arbitration. 13 The Court's Mastrobuono opinion left a number of questions
unanswered, and generated several more in the process. This Part discusses
9 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
10 See id. at 794 ("Since enforcement of an award of punitive damages as a purely
private remedy would violate strong public policy, an arbitrator's award which imposes
punitive damages should be vacated.").
11 Compare Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that unless the parties to a securities arbitration agreement expressly provided
for arbitral awards of punitive damages in their contract, securities arbitrators were
precluded from issuing them, even in the absence of a New York choice-of-law clause)
with Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1061-63 (9th Cir.
1991) (upholding an arbitral award of punitive damages even though the parties had
selected the law of New York as the controlling authority over their disagreements, and
thus the rule of Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794, prohibiting arbitral awards of punitive
damages, on grounds that the parties' agreement had also adopted the AAA's broad
remedial provisions to govern any disputes regarding arbitration).
12 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
13 One scholar, for example, has written that "Mastrobuono left open a number of
questions, and by its emphasis on contractual assent, begged a most significant one:
What happens when parties agree to prohibit or limit arbitral awards of punitive
damages?" Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 28. Professor Stipanowich went on to state
that the Court's Mastrobuono opinion, far from resolving the issues swirling about
arbitral awards of punitive damages, only catalyzed further debate within the securities
industry regarding all of the questions it left unanswered, as well as the new issues to
which it gave rise. See id.
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the Garrity decision and its aftermath, as well as the split among the federal
circuit courts over the issue of whether the rule articulated in Garrity
should be followed. Finally, it addresses the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
regarding arbitral awards of punitive damages and surveys the unsettled
state of the law in the wake of Mastrobuono.
A. Establishing the Garrity Rule- The Debate Begins
1. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.
"An arbitrator has no power to award punitive damages, even if agreed
upon by the parties .... Punitive damages is a sanction reserved to the
State, a public policy of such magnitude as to call for judicial intervention
to prevent its contravention." 14 This describes the state of New York law
just two decades ago regarding awards of punitive damages within the
theater of securities arbitration, the result of the New York Court of
Appeals' decision in the landmark case of Garn'ty v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.15
There it was held that because punitive damages are within the exclusive
province of governmental authority, they necessarily remain outside the
scope of an arbitrator's power to fashion remedies in the out-of-court
resolution of disputes. 16 It was not long before securities brokers and
dealers seized upon the Garrity rule to insulate themselves from exposure
to arbitral awards of punitive damages by including New York choice-of-
law provisions in their customer agreements. 17 Not surprisingly, many soon
14 Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794.
15 See id.
16 See id.; Carroll E. Neesemann & Maren E. Nelson, Securities Arbitration
Damages, in SECURrrIES ARBITRATION 1998: REDEFINING PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES,
at 425, 450 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1062, 1998). The
Garrity court determined that allowing arbitrators to issue punitive damages would
usurp the state as the exclusive and sovereign body holding the power to punish and
expressed a fear that allowing private parties to inflict punishments upon one another
would harken back to days of old when the rule of law was the law of the jungle and
disputes were resolved by fights to the death of the losing party. See Garrity, 353
N.E.2d at 796 ("In imposing the penal sanctions in private arrangements, a tradition of
the rule of law in organized society is violated. One purpose of the rule of law is to
require that the use of coercion be controlled by the State.").
17 See Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 450. As is discussed at greater
length below, and as Neesemann and Nelson have noted, the Garrity decision is, or at
least it was, of great import to the law of securities arbitration. After the New York
Court of Appeals engrafted the Garrity rule (that is, that arbitrators do not enjoy the
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came to view Garrity as a catalyst for an evolution in the law of securities
arbitration.18 But this refusal to bar arbitral awards of punitive damages is
in itself a recognition of the evolution that the Garrity decision signaled.
That many commentators and courts have failed to adopt the Garrity rule as
sound policy reflects both concerns about and recognition of the fact that
the Garrity court was unwilling to subscribe to the long-held view of
arbitration as "a semi-autonomous system of justice largely free from court
censorship or oversight, functioning not as part of the judicial process but
in lieu of it." 19
Joan Garrity was the author of two books, published by Lyle Stuart,
Inc. Contracts between the author and her publisher included provisions
under which the parties were to enter into arbitration in the event of a
breach or other dispute. 20 Those provisions, however, neither mentioned
the possibility of punitive damages nor granted an arbitrator power to
award them. 21 Ultimately, a dispute arose between Garrity and her
power to issue punitive damages) into the law of the land of New York, a great many
securities brokers and dealers set forth New York choice-of-law clauses in their
customer agreements. The effects of such provisions was, of course, or at least it was
hoped, to incorporate the law of New York-including the Garrity rule-into the
agreement, thereby effectively precluding the possibility that arbitrators might level
punitive damage awards against the brokerage firm or individual broker when disputes
with customers or employees entered the arbitral forum. See id.
18 This evolution, however, has met with considerable resistance. After Garrity
was decided, a number of courts, both federal and state, were reluctant to follow its
lead. See, e.g., Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp.
353, 364 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd on appeal, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985). The
Willoughby court determined that the reasons supplied by the Garrity court for refusing
to uphold arbitral awards of punitive damages were not of sufficient weight to displace
the "principles of arbitral flexibility, judicial deference to an arbitrator's superior
knowledge of a given business, and extreme skepticism of judicial intrusion into the
disputes parties have agreed to arbitrate." Id. State courts have declined to follow the
Garrity rule as well. See, e.g., Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Constr., Inc., 676
S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding an arbitral award of punitive damages for
breach of contract and a discrete claim involving tortious conduct on a construction
project, brought by subcontractors against their general contractor). Similarly, the New
York County Lawyers' Association recommended that the state legislature of New York
dispense with the Garrity rule by statute. See Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 14 n.79
(citing COMMIrEE ON ARBrrRATION AND ADR, NEw YORK CouNTY LAWYER'S Ass'N,
PUNITIvE DAMAGES: A PROPOSAL FOR RELIEF 9 (1993)).
19 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv. 953-59 (1986).
20 See Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794.
21 See id.
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publisher, and Garrity brought suit for damages in 1971 on grounds of
fraudulent inducement, gross underpayment of royalties, and several other
"malicious" acts designed to harass her.22 While that suit was pending,
Garrity filed a second suit on grounds of wrongful withholding of $45,000
in royalties.23 The defendant, Lyle Stuart, Inc. (Lyle Stuart) moved for a
stay pending arbitration, which was granted, following which plaintiff
demanded arbitration. 24 Garrity requested that the arbitrator grant her
$45,000 in withheld royalties, as well as $7,500 in punitive damages,
alleging that Lyle Stuart had withheld such royalties with the aim of
coercing her into withdrawing the 1971 claim.25 When, at the arbitration
proceedings, the arbitrators rejected Lyle Stuart's objections to the power
of the arbitration panel to issue awards of punitive damages, Lyle Stuart's
representatives walked out of the proceedings. The arbitrators then awarded
Garrity both compensatory and punitive damages.26
When Garrity moved to confirm the arbitral award, Lyle Stuart again
objected on grounds that the issuance of punitive damages fell beyond the
scope of arbitral authority and violated public policy. 27 This time, though,
the New York Court of Appeals, per Judge Breitel, agreed, stating,
"[s]ince enforcement of an award of punitive damages as a purely private
remedy would violate public policy, an arbitrator's award which imposes
punitive damages, even though agreed upon by the parties, should be
vacated." 28 With that stroke of the judicial pen, Judge Breitel engrafted the







28 Id. at 795. Judge Breitel's determination that arbitral awards of punitive
damages are contrary to public policy was based in no small measure upon the fact that
punitive damages are intended to ensure the maintenance of public rights and to deter
the actor involved in the instant situation as well as others similarly situated from
engaging in the same sort of culpable behavior, rather than to redress private wrongs.
"It is a social exemplary 'remedy,'" Judge Breitel wrote, "not a private compensatory
remedy." Id. Moreover, Judge Breitel argued that the American constitutional system,
like all organized societies, is founded upon a rule of law that removes the imposition of
coercive penal measures from the purview of private actors. "For centuries the power
to punish has been a monopoly of the State, and not that of any private
individual.... The day is long past since barbaric man achieved redress by private
punitive measures." Id. at 796-97.
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punitive damages were placed beyond the reach of arbitral authority. The
ramifications of that decision were soon felt across the length and breadth
of the securities industry. 29
2. The Effects of the Garrity Decision on the Securities
Industry
Garrity, of course, had little to do with the process of securities
arbitration. But securities brokerage firms read that decision as a
mechanism by which to immunize themselves against arbitral awards of
punitive damages, provided that New York law would control any
arbitration proceedings in which the securities broker might be engaged. 30
As such, for nearly two decades following the promulgation of the Garrity
rule, securities firms typically included choice-of-law provisions in their
customer agreements specifying New York law as the controlling authority
over all disputes. 31 Customer agreements between securities brokers and
their customers also tend to include a clause mandating that all
controversies be submitted to arbitration under the arbitration rules of one
of the Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs), such as the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. (NYSE) or the NASD, none of which speaks explicitly to
the issue of punitive damages. 32 Combined, the effect of these provisions in
29 See Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 4 (noting, for instance, that the NASD, "the
body charged with addressing arbitration policies and procedures for the entire
securities industry," has joined the debate regarding arbitral awards of punitive damages
by proposing a number of reforms (discussed in greater detail in Part V, infra) in the
wake of the confusion spawned by the Garrity and Mastrobuono decisions).
30 See John P. Cleary, Defending Punitive Damage Claims in Securities Arbitration
After the NASD Reform, in SEcuR TIs ARBIRATION 1997, at 771, 775 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 999, 1997). The NASD Arbitration Policy
Task Force has recommended that instead of allowing the parties to a securities dispute
to select the law that will control its resolution, the law of the state of the investor's
residence at the time a claim is filed should control in making the determination as to
whether securities arbitrators enjoy the power to issue punitive damages. See id.
31 See Bradford D. Kaufman & Anne Tennant Cooney, Punitive Damages in
Securities Arbitration, in SEcutrrIs LIIGATION 1996, at 599, 623-24 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 958, 1996).
32 See id. at 623. Kaufman and Cooney suggest that the following language is
reflective of many of the agreements that were formed between securities firms and
their customers during the period immediately following the Garrity decision:
This agreement shall... be governed by the laws of the State of New
York.... Any controversy arising out of or relating to the [customer's] accounts,
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customer agreements is to require that all disputes be resolved through
arbitration, and then to preclude arbitrators from issuing punitive damages
against the securities dealer. 33 Thus, customer agreements of this nature
operate to insulate the securities dealers from punitive damages without
ever making forthright mention of that fact. By rendering punitive damages
unavailable through the mechanism of a New York choice-of-law clause
and the incorporation of the Garrity rule, securities firms found a channel
through which to proscribe the issuance of punitive damages against them
without telling customers that they were doing so. The courts, however, did
not always prove as willing to enforce these agreements as the securities
brokerage firms might have hoped.
B. The Garrity Rule and the Schism Among the Federal Circuits
Some federal circuit courts were willing to uphold these New York
choice-of-law clauses as a ban on arbitral awards of punitive damages,
provided that the clauses in issue stood in accordance with the intentions of
the parties to the customer agreements. 34 Others construed them as an
to transactions with [the brokerage firm, its] officers, directors, agents and/or
employees... shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in
effect of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Board of
Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., as the customer may elect.
Id. at 623 n.133 (citing David J. Effron, Muddied Waters: Awards of Punitive Damages
in Disputes Arbitrated Pursuant to Brokerage Firm Customer Agreements, 7 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 333, 334 n.4 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Barbier v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991))).
33 See Cleary, supra note 30, at 775.
34 See Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 451. Neesemarn and Nelson
observed that under Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to its decision in Mastrobuono,
a federal court's view of the effect of a New York choice-of-law clause in a contract
was dependent upon a particular court's reading of the specific contract placed before it
for interpretation. Therefore, some courts were willing to read a New York choice-of-
law clause as a ban on arbitral awards of punitive damages, while others disregarded in
wholesale that effect of the decision to make New York law the controlling authority
over a securities arbitration agreement. See id. Before Mastrobuono was decided the
majority of the federal circuit courts was willing- to uphold arbitral awards of punitive
damages despite the inclusion of a New York choice-of-law clause in customer
agreements. See id. at 452-53. Often, the courts that were willing to uphold arbitral
awards of punitive damages justified that decision in part upon grounds that it stood in
conformity with the federal policy favoring the arbitrability of claims and the attendant
policy of granting arbitrators broad discretion to fashion remedies. See id. at 453; see
also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
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indication of the parties' agreement that New York law would govern the
"substantive standards for granting remedies, and not the question of what
remedies, including punitive damages, are available in arbitration." 35 The
courts falling into the latter category interpreted the inclusion of directives
in the customer agreements to pursue arbitration under the various SRO
arbitration rules (which appear in almost all customer agreements) as
evidence that the parties intended to allow for arbitral awards of punitive
damages, because those rules tend to carry expansive remedial
provisions. 36
1. Federal Circuits Subscribing to the Garrity Rule
The Second and Seventh Circuits determined that the addition of a New
York choice-of-law clause to a securities broker's customer agreement
precluded the issuance of arbitral awards of punitive damages. 37 In Barbier
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the Second Circuit found itself embroiled
in the fallout from an arbitral award of punitive damages against the
defendant securities brokerage firm after plaintiff customers signed a
customer agreement specifying New York law as controlling authority over
all disputes. 38 Put simply, the court vacated the arbitrator's award of
punitive damages on grounds that the Garrity rule prohibited it.39 The court
(stating that the FAA is a "congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements").
35 Id.
36 See id. For example, the Eighth Circuit was willing to uphold a punitive
damages award despite the inclusion of a Minnesota choice-of-law clause (Minnesota
law precluded arbitral awards of punitive damages) in the parties' agreement where the
parties had also incorporated the arbitration rules of the AAA into their contract. It
reached this result because those rules accord arbitrators the authority "to award any
relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable," which the court interpreted to
include punitive damages. See id. at 452-53 (citing Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 887-88
n.6 (8th Cir. 1993)).
37 See Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir.
1991); Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984).
38 See Barbier, 948 F.2d at 121-22. It hardly needs to be stated that the plaintiff
investors contended that the Garrity rule conflicted with the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(1994), meaning that, in their view, the latter preempted the former, whereas defendant
brokerage firm maintained that the New York choice-of-law provision in the customer
agreement and the Garrity rule inherent therein required the court to vacate the
arbitrator's award of punitive damages, see Barbier, 948 F.2d at 121.
39 See Barbier, 948 F.2d at 121.
216
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reasoned that the Federal Arbitration Act' (FAA) demanded that all -private
arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms, and that in this
instance, the agreement between the parties was plain. 41 It was to be
governed by the laws of New York, including the Garrity rule, pursuant to
its choice-of-law clause. 42 Thus, the award of punitive damages reached
beyond the scope of the arbitrator's authority. 43
The Seventh Circuit reached the same result in Pierson v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., though for slightly different reasons.44 Furthermore, the
Seventh Circuit was willing to enforce the New York choice-of-law clause
and its incorporation of the Garrity rule in the arbitration agreement at
issue in that case despite one party's superior knowledge of the limitations
that it might place on an arbitrator's authority, which is to say, even though
one of the parties was unaware that a New York choice-of-law clause
would preclude an arbitral award of punitive damages.45 Not every federal
circuit court, however, viewed Garrity or its incorporation into securities
firms' customer agreements in such a favorable light.
40 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 121-22.
43 See id. at 122 (stating that "ft]he application of Garrity here is not in derogation
of the parties' agreement but rather in accordance with that agreement," and that its
application was therefore in keeping with the FAA).
44 See Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984).
The Pierson court held that it would enforce the controverted New York choice-of-law
clause even if the plaintiff investors were unaware that their customer agreement with
defendant brokerage firm required them to arbitrate all disputes or that it prevented
them from being awarded punitive damages in an arbitration proceeding. Plaintiffs'
ignorance of the implications of these contractual provisions would not operate to render
either the contract or its choice-of-law clause unconscionable:
Perhaps the Piersons did not realize that punitive damages are not permitted in
arbitration under New York law ... but they were aware that the law of New
York was to apply exclusively .... The Piersons cannot use their failure to inquire
about the ramifications of that clause to avoid the consequences of agreed-to
arbitration."
Id.
45 See id.; Cleary, supra note 30, at 776 (observing that "[t]he court held that the
parties' agreement to a New York choice-of-law provision should be enforced even
though one party may not have known that this precluded a punitive damages award").
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2. Federal Circuits Refusing to Uphold the Garrity Rule
Other federal circuits were not so quick to vacate arbitral awards of
punitive damages, provided that the parties' agreement established that
arbitration of disputes was to proceed according to the arbitration of rules
of an SRO or the American Arbitration Association (AAA), but irrespective
of whether the agreement contained a New York choice-of-law clause. 46
For example, in Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,47 the Eleventh
Circuit held that when viewed in the light of the federal policy favoring
arbitration created by the FAA, any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a
claim should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 48 The court then noted that
the customer agreement signed by the Bonars created such a doubt with
respect to the arbitrability of a claim for punitive damages. On the one
hand, it contained a New York choice-of-law clause, but, on the other, it
"incorporat[ed] by reference the rules of the American Arbitration
Association, [which] allowol the arbitrators to 'grant any remedy or relief
which [they] deem[ed] just and equitable and within the scope of the
agreement of parties.', 49 Faced with two apparently conflicting provisions
with respect to the arbitrability of a punitive damages claim, the court
resolved the issue in favor of arbitration. It interpreted the New York
choice-of-law clause as a designation of the substantive law to be applied in
determining whether punitive damages should be awarded based on the
46 See Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 452-53.
47 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988). Bonar stems from a claim for arbitration filed
by Mr. and Mrs. Bonar against Dean Witter. After they had opened a securities account
with defendant brokerage firm, Dean Witter discovered that the account executive
placed in charge of the Bonars' account had embezzled a significant amount of funds
from the Bonars' account as well as from those of several other Dean Witter customers.
Dean Witter then contacted both the customers whose accounts had been affected by the
fraud and governmental authorities. Thereafter, the Bonars filed a claim for arbitration.
At the hearing, the defendant brokerage firm conceded liability for compensatory
damages. The arbitration panel, however, awarded compensatory damages and punitive
damages in the amount of $150,000 against Dean Witter. Dean Witter subsequently
learned that an expert testifying on behalf of the Bonars at the arbitration hearing
misrepresented his credentials to the arbitration panel. In a bold-faced lie, this expert
stated that he had graduated from two universities when in fact he had not. Thus, Dean
Witter moved to vacate or modify the award, but the district court denied its motion,
and this appeal to the Eleventh Circuit followed. See id. at 1379-81.
48 See id. at 1387 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
49 Id. at 1388 (alterations in original).
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conduct of the parties, as distinguished from a determination as to the sorts
of remedies, including punitive damages, that could be applied.50
The First Circuit reached a similar conclusion on different grounds,
though outside the context of securities arbitration. In Raytheon Co. v.
Automated Business Systems, Inc.,51 that court interpreted a contract
formed between a manufacturer of word processing machines and one of its
dealers providing (1) that all disputes arising in connection with the
agreement be settled by arbitration, (2) that all such arbitral hearings should
proceed according to the rules of the AAA, and (3) that California law
would control the interpretation of the agreement. 52 When a dispute arose
between the parties, it was submitted to an arbitration panel, which in turn
leveled punitive damages against the defendant manufacturer. 53 In
reviewing the district court's decision to decline defendant manufacturer's
motion to vacate the award of punitive damages, the First Circuit, like the
Eleventh Circuit, cited the "strong federal policy in favor of arbitration" as
a basis for resolving any doubts with respect to arbitrability of disputes in
favor of arbitration. 54 In keeping with that policy, the Raytheon court
replicated the Supreme Court's statement in dicta that "agreements to
arbitrate are to be 'generously construed'" 55 as grounds for holding that the
agreement between Raytheon and Automated Business Systems indicated,
at minimum, an intention to resolve through arbitration any dispute that
would otherwise be settled in a court, and to allow the chosen dispute
resolvers to award the same varieties and forms of damages or relief as a
court would be empowered to award. Since courts are empowered to
award punitive damages with respect to certain types of claims, the
50 See id. at 1387 (stating that the choice-of-law clause, when coupled with the
contractual reference to the rules of the AAA, "does not deprive the arbitrators of their
authority to award punitive damages").
51 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
52 See id. at 7.
53 See id. at 7-8.
54 Id. at 9 (stating that "[w]hile hortatory statements such as [the one setting forth
the "strong federal policy in favor of arbitration"] are helpful in framing our discussion,
our conclusion that the arbitrators did not exceed their powers in awarding punitive
damages in this case is predicated upon substantially more rigorous analysis" (citing
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983))).
55 Id. at 10 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985)).
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Raytheon-Automated arbitrators would be equally empowered. 56
In the eyes of the Raytheon court, the grant of power given the courts by
the Constitution is coextensive with the grant of power given arbitrators by
the contract that requires disputes to be submitted to them.
In arriving at this result, however, it is important to note that the court
essentially ignored the California choice-of-law clause in the parties'
agreement, which otherwise would have allowed for the imposition of
arbitral awards of punitive damages only in those instances in which the
parties' arbitration agreement specifically so provided. 57 In the end, the
court's rationale for failing to give effect to the choice-of-law clause simply
came down to the federal policy in favor of arbitration, notwithstanding the
question of whether this federal policy was encompassed by the intention of
the parties as memorialized in their agreement. 58 Presumably, so far as the
First Circuit was concerned, arbitrators enjoy the same broad powers to
fashion remedies as do juries and the judiciary, notwithstanding the due
process questions to which that view gives rise. 59 Whether the Supreme
Court would agree with the decision of the First Circuit and its like-minded
counterparts, however, was yet to be seen.
C. The Supreme Court Speaks
In the midst of this split among the federal circuit courts regarding the
issue of whether arbitrators might issue punitive damages, it was at long
56 Id. Essentially, then, the effect of the Raytheon court's holding was to vest in
arbitrators the same powers and authorities normally reserved to the judiciary and the
public justice system (with all of the apparati intrinsic to it which have been designed
and implemented to ensure that defendants not be deprived of property without first
having been subjected to the process due them), on the basis of a simplistic theory that
"[w]hat is [a]vailable in [c]ourt [s]hould [b]e [a]vailable in [a]rbitration." Cleary, supra
note 30, at 776.
57 See Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11; Cleary, supra note 30, at 776.
58 See Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 12. Thus, the court stated:
Where such conduct could give rise to punitive damages if proved to a court, there
is no compelling reason to prohibit a party which proves the same conduct to a
panel of arbitrators from recovering the same damages. Certainly, the fact that the
parties agreed to resolve their dispute through an expedited and less formal
procedure does not mean that they should be required to surrender a legitimate
claim to damages.
Id.
59 See infra Part IV.
220
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last that the Supreme Court finally spoke on the matter. In Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,60
the Supreme Court found that the FAA did not require the arbitration of all
disputes, but that it did require the courts to enforce private agreements
between the parties to settle disputes through arbitration. 61 The -arbitratioii
agreement at issue in Volt contained a California choice-of-law provision,
which operated to prevent the arbitration of a dispute that arose between
the parties. 62 Thus, the Supreme Court refused to compel the parties to
60 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
61 See id. at 478. In other words, the Court reiterated its vision of the FAA as a
congressional declaration overruling the reluctance, indeed the refusal, exhibited by the
judiciary at the time of the passage of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements. See
id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)). In order
to accomplish that end, the FAA aimed to ensure that all arbitration agreements
formulated between the parties be enforced according to their terms, by placing such
agreements on par with any other contract. See id. (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). Because Congress sought to give effect to private
agreements to arbitrate, the Volt Court further recognized that the FAA functions to
displace state statutes which force parties to settle disputes in a judicial forum when they
have agreed to settle their disputes through arbitration. See id. at 479 (citing Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)). The Court went on to state that.
it does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
under different rules set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be quite
inimical to the FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a
matter of consent, not coercion, and the parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they may see fit.
Id. Therefore, the Volt Court seemed to interpret the FAA to mean that the parties to an
arbitration agreement were free to structure the terms and conditions of that agreement
in any manner they deemed mutually desirable, including the specification of a choice-
of-law clause.
62 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 471. Volt was centered about a construction contract
between Volt and the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University under
which Volt was to install electrical systems on the campus of Leland Stanford. When a
controversy arose between the parties as to compensation for extra work performed,
Volt demanded arbitration. In response, Leland Stanford filed suit against Volt and two
other construction companies (with whom Leland Stanford did not have an arbitration
agreement) working on the project in California state court, alleging fraud and breach of
contract. Because the contract between Volt and Leland Stanford contained a California
choice-of-law provision, it incorporated a California statute that allowed for a stay of
arbitration pending the resolution of related litigation between parties to the arbitration
agreement and parties not bound thereby. The effect of that .statute, then, was to allow
for a stay of arbitration between-Volt and Leland Stanford pending the resolution of the
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arbitrate their dispute, in keeping with the terms of the arbitration
agreements specifying California law as the controlling authority over all
disputes but in spite of the federal policy in favor of arbitration codified by
the FAA. 63 That is, though the Court recognized that there exists a federal
policy in favor of arbitration, that policy could not override the terms of a
private arbitration agreement. When a federal policy regarding the exalted
status of arbitration conflicted with the terms of the parties' agreement, that
federal policy must be subordinated to enforcement of the terms of the
contract.64
The FAA, in fact, demanded as much. By creating a federal policy in
favor of arbitration, the FAA ensured that agreements to arbitrate be
treated as any other contract might be treated. Thus, section 2 of the FAA
mandates that agreements to arbitrate be enforced according to their terms,
and, more pointedly, that those agreements be "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable ... " 65 Because "the FAA contains no pre-emptive provision,
nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
arbitration," the Court found that it would not prevent the application of
other related cases in which Leland Stanford had filed complaints. See id. at 470-71.
63 See id. at 478. The Court described its jurisprudence in this area as having
recognized that the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not
agreed to do so .... nor does it prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from
excluding certain claims from the scope of their arbitration agreement .... It
simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like
other contracts, in accordance with their terms.
Id.
64 See id. at 470.
65 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). That statute provides in full:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
Id. (emphasis added). Seen through the lens of the FAA, then, the Supreme Court
determined that the parties' agreement to arbitrate according to California law, which in
this case translated into a stay of arbitration procedures, must be enforced
notwithstanding the policy decision underlying the FAA to encourage the arbitration of
all disputes. In brief, the FAA did not prevent the application of a state law preventing
arbitral hearings when the parties had, in effect, agreed to be governed by it. See Volt,
489 U.S. at 477.
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California state law under the parties' choice-of-law clause. 66 The Court
interpreted the congressional intention that arbitration agreements be
enforced according to their terms to overcome the federal policy favoring
arbitration. That remained true here, despite the fact that application of
state law resulted in a stay of arbitration rather than a compulsion to submit
a dispute to arbitration. Thus, the Court held "that application of [state law]
is not pre-empted by the [FAA] in a case where the parties ... will be
governed by [state law]." 67 The federal policy in favor of arbitration was to
be displaced by the federal policy in favor of enforcing agreements to
arbitrate according to their terms. 68
After Volt was handed down by the Court, the securities industry and
the attorneys representing its brokers and dealers invoked its holding with
some frequency to secure the enforcement of New York choice-of-law
provisions set forth in their customer agreements. 69 However, the Volt
Court did not go so far as to guarantee that customer agreements containing
New York choice-of-law clauses necessarily would be regarded by the
lower courts as incorporating the Garrity rule. Rather, it merely meant that
in some instances arbitral awards of punitive damages could be precluded
by a customer agreement between a securities dealer and its customers
containing a New York choice-of-law provision.70 However, whether that
conclusion would be reached would be conditioned upon whether a court
charged with the interpretation of the agreement would interpret that
agreement's New York choice-of-law clause as manifesting the parties'
intent to incorporate New York arbitration law, and thus the Garrity rule,
or simply as a manifestation of the parties' intent to limit the incorporation
of New York law to the substantive law of that state, which would not
66 Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. Though the Court found that the FAA did not pre-empt
the application of California law in this case, it did limit that holding to some extent by
recognizing that in other situations, state law could be pre-empted if its application
would result in a barrier to the complete fulfillment of congressional purposes. See id.
Here, the congressional purpose behind the FAA was, not frustrated, because the
purpose of the Act was to ensure that arbitration agreements be enforced according to
their terms.
67 1d. at 470.
68 See id.
69 See Cleary, supra note 30, at 776.
70 See Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 451 (stating that "under Volt, the
availability of punitive damages in arbitration has hinged on the courts' interpretation of
the parties' arbitration agreements, and particularly on whether a New York choice-of-
law provision manifests the parties' intent to incorporate the Garrity rule").
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include the Garrity rule. 71
Thus, the Volt Court left the fundamental question for securities
arbitration looming large: does the inclusion of a New York choice-of-law
provision in a customer agreement mandating the arbitration of disputes
arising thereunder necessarily preclude the issuance of arbitral awards of
punitive damages by virtue of its incorporation of the Garrity rule? That
question was left unanswered, in fact, for six years, until the Court decided
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.72 In the interim, that query
had to be resolved by whatever lower court was faced with the task of
interpreting a customer agreement containing a New York choice-of-law
provision, because under Volt, the lower courts were being forced to
determine whether such a clause manifested the parties' intent to fuse the
Garrity rule into the terms of their agreement.73 In Mastrobuono, the Court
took another step towards an answer to this question.
D. The Supreme Court Speaks-Again
1. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.
The Mastrobuono Court enforced an arbitral award of punitive
damages against a securities dealer despite the New York choice-of-law
clause in the customer agreement that it had signed with the plaintiff.74
That case was spawned by a suit brought in federal district court against the
securities brokerage firm of Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. by Antonio
Mastrobuono and his wife, who alleged that the defendant brokerage firm
had mishandled their securities account on the basis of various federal and
state law theories. 75 The customer agreement signed by the Mastrobuonos
and Shearson Lehman Hutton not only contained a New York choice-of-
law provision, but further stated that all disputes were to be submitted to
arbitration, which was to proceed under the arbitration rules of the
71 See id.
72 514 U.S. 52 (1995). It should, however, be pointed out that Mastrobuono did
not determine the threshold question of whether punitive damages are an appropriate
award in the arbitration context. See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 624.
73 See Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 455.
74 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 64 (finding that irrespective of the New York
choice-of-law provision in the parties' agreement, " [tihe arbitral award should have
been enforced as within the scope of the contract").
75 See id. at 54-55.
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NASD.76 As such, the defendant securities firm filed a motion to compel
arbitration, which the district court granted. 77
The arbitration panel ruled in favor of the Mastrobuonos, awarding
both compensatory and punitive damages, the latter award being in the
amount of $400,000.78 Defendant paid the compensatory damages, but
moved to vacate the punitive award, and the district court granted its
motion. 79 That decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit on grounds
that the New York choice-of-law clause in the parties' agreement
incorporated the Garrity rule's ban on arbitral awards of punitive
damages. 80 The Mastrobuonos then appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, which reversed the Seventh Circuit. 81
The Court framed the issue in Mastrobuono as being whether the
parties' inclusion of a New York choice-of-law clause incorporated the
Garrity rule into their agreement. 82 In what initially seemed to be a strong
blow to the ability of securities firms to preclude arbitral awards of punitive
damages by including a New York choice-of-law clause in their customer
agreements, the Court answered that question in the negative. 83 Because the
NASD rules of arbitration referenced in the customer agreement provide
that arbitrators may award "damages and other relief," 84 they did not
require the conclusion, that the provisions of the agreement authorized




80 See id. at 54-55.
81 See id. The Court stated that it granted certiorari in this case to settle the dispute
among the circuit courts of appeals as to the question of "whether a contractual choice-
of-law provision may preclude an arbitral award of punitive damages that otherwise
would be proper." Id. at 55.
82 See id. at 58. Mastrobuono seems something of an odd case for the Supreme
Court to have reviewed, because ultimately, its decision was nothing more than the
product of contractual interpretation. Thus, the case may hold little precedential value,
as the next dispute to arise under the terms of a securities firm's customer agreement
must be interpreted according to the terms of that particular agreement. See Kaufman &
Cooney, supra note 31, at 626-27 ("In the end, this case came down to the mundane
chore of the Supreme Court interpreting the terms of a single, isolated contract....
Until the issue is squarely addressed... the threshold issue of whether arbitral bodies
may constitutionally levy punitive awards will remain a gray area of contention.").
83 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63.
84 Id. at 61 (citing NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE 3741(e) (National
Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1993) (amended 1998)).
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punitive damages. But, the Court reasoned, their incorporation into the
Mastrobuonos' contract would at least bear an interpretation maintaining
that punitive awards were contemplated by the parties at the time of
contracting.8 5 When that determination was coupled with the New York
choice-of-law provision, the Court found the customer agreement to be, at
best, an ambiguous manifestation of the parties' intentions regarding the
authority of the arbitrators to issue punitive damages: "At most, the choice-
of-law clause introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that
would otherwise allow punitive damage awards." 86 The Court then cited
the federal policy favoring arbitration as grounds for resolving
controversies over the arbitrability of disputes in favor of arbitration.8 7
Furthermore, the Court turned to the fundamental rule of contract law that
ambiguous contract provisions be construed against the drafter to find that
Shearson Lehman Hutton "drafted an ambiguous document, and they
cannot now claim the benefit of doubt." 88
Construing Shearson Lehman Hutton's customer agreement against its
drafter, then, the Court harmonized the facially discordant choice-of-law
and arbitration clauses by finding that the choice-of-law clause
"encompass[ed] substantive principles that New York courts would apply,
but not to include those special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators.
Thus, the choice-of-law provision covers the rights and duties of the
parties, while the arbitration clause covers arbitration; neither sentence
intrudes upon the other." 89 But because passages such as this one from the
85 See id. at 61.
86 Id. at 62.
87 See id. (noting that as was discussed in the Volt decision, "when a court
interprets such provisions in an agreement covered by the FAA, 'due regard must be
given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the
arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration'" (quoting Volt Info. Sciences v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989))).
88 Id. at 63. The Court observed that the theory behind the rule calling for
ambiguous contracts to be construed against the drafter is "to protect the party who did
not choose the language from an unintended or unfair result," and found that rationale
to be "well suited to the facts of this case." Id. The Court feared that by interpreting the
New York choice-of-law provision in the Mastrobuonos' agreement to include the
Garrity rule, it would be giving effect to a result that the Mastrobuonos may not have
considered or even been aware of-that they would be abandoning their right to pursue
punitive damages against their securities firm-simply by signing a standard form
contract to arbitrate all disputes.
89 Id. at 64. Otherwise the arbitration and choice-of-law provisions would remain
irreconcilable, the former allowing for arbitral awards of punitive damages, and the
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Court's Mastrobuono opinion seem to speak only to the language used in
the arbitration agreement at issue in that case, the extent to which
Mastrobuono resolved the dispute among the federal circuits over
arbitrators' authority to issue punitive damages remains elusive. 90
2. The Aftermath of Mastrobuono
Mastrobuono left a host of questions unanswered, and it gave rise to
new problems as well. What the Mastrobuono Court failed to take into
account was the fact that Shearson Lehman Hutton, by virtue of its
membership in the NASD, would have been forced to arbitrate any disputes
arising between itself and its customers regardless of whether it had signed
a customer agreement mandating the same. 91 Therefore, while the
Mastrobuono decision allows for securities dealers to draft their customer
agreements so as to preclude arbitral awards of punitive damages, provided
that such provisions are express and written with precision, 92 it is not clear
that member firms of the NASD could incorporate such a clause into their
contracts with customers without running afoul of the NASD arbitration
rules. But those rules, as they were read by the Mastrobuono Court,
prevent securities firms from drafting contracts that preclude arbitral
awards of punitive damages. 93 The effect of such a reading is that securities
latter forbidding them. This, said the Court, would be an "untenable" interpretation. Id.90 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
91 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 626. Because Shearson Lehman
Hutton would have been forced to arbitrate all disputes under the rules of the NASD
pursuant to the rules of that SRO even if it had not included such a provision in its
customer agreement, it hardly seems dispositive that the brokerage firm drafted the
agreement placed before the Court for interpretation. See id.
92 See id. at 626-27.
93 In Mastrobuono, the Court read the parties' agreement to arbitrate all disputes
pursuant to the NASD rules of arbitral procedures as evidence that the parties may have
contemplated awards of punitive damages as falling within the scope of the customer
agreement at the time this contract was signed. The Court found that because the
NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure permits arbitrators to award "damages and
other relief," the agreement between the Mastrobuonos and Shearson Lehman Hutton
was broad enough to accommodate punitive awards by arbitrators. See Mastrobuono,
514 U.S. at 60-61. For verification of this conclusion, the Court turned to an arbitration
manual produced by the NASD which provides that "[tihe issue of punitive damages
may arise with great frequency in arbitrations. Parties to arbitration are informed that
arbitrators can consider punitive damages as a remedy." Id. (citing Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 713 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Neesemann
& Nelson, supra note 16, at 457. Given this reading of the NASD's Code of Arbitration
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firms which are members of the NASD are required to subject themselves
to arbitral proceedings to resolve conflicts with customers or employees,
and to allow for arbitrators to level punitive damages against them. Those
proceedings, however, are not equipped with the due process machinery of
the public justice system, despite the fact that this machinery has been
mandated by the punitive damages jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and
which is designed to prevent the possibility of arbitrary deprivations of
property that exist whenever punitive damages are issued. 94
The conclusion that securities firms subject to the rules of the NASD
cannot contract around arbitral awards of punitive damages, even in spite
of the fact that the narrow holding in Mastrobuono might otherwise allow
them to do so, 95 is supported by the NASD's adoption of the "Anti-Goren
Procedure by no less an authority than the Supreme Court of the United States, it would
seem to be impossible for member firms of the NASD, bound by its arbitration rules (as
well as, apparently, its manuals for arbitrators), to draft any agreement that would
preclude punitive damage awards by arbitrators. See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note
31, at 651 (" [A]rbitration, as a means of resolving disputes, is practically unavoidable.
This is because the rules of the NASD formally mandate the arbitration of all disputes
and controversies- regardless of the existence or inexistence of a signed arbitration
agreement containing a predispute arbitration clause.").
94 See infra Part IV.
95 See Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 28 (observing that "Mastrobuono left open a
number of questions, and by its emphasis on contractual assent, begged a most
significant one: [w]hat happens when the parties agree to prohibit or limit arbitral
awards of punitive damages?"); see also Robert S. Clemente & Karen Kupersmith,
"Cap"s [sic] in Securities Arbitration: A Discussion of Conflicts of Law, Attorneys
Fees, Punitive Damages from the Arbitrator's Viewpoint, in SEcuRrrms ARBITRATION
1997, at 219, 234 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 998, 1997)
(stating that the Mastrobuono opinion "may have led many parties and attorneys to
believe that arbitrators may now award punitive damages in an amount of their choosing
whenever they see fit. This, however, is not necessarily the case. Punitive damages
remain what they always were-an extraordinary remedy to be used in extraordinary
situations."); Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 626-27 ("Mastrobuono does
suggest that a customer agreement might be drafted to preclude the arbitration of
punitive damages. The problem in Shearson's case, apparently, was that their customer
agreement was simply too ambiguous with respect to the issue of punitive damages.");
Marinuzzi, supra note 2, at 72 (noting that "Mastrobuono does not unequivocally
resolve the dispute"). To be sure, the Mastrobuono decision standing in isolation,
divorced from the NASD rules and the Court's reading of them, does seem to allow for
securities firms to draft customer agreements that will preclude arbitral awards of
punitive damages. However, when a securities firm is subjected to the NASD rules,
those rules may operate to preclude the firm from presenting the customer with any such
agreement. See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 626-27.
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rules." 96 The Anti-Goren rules effectually operate to prohibit securities
dealers from including language in arbitration agreements that restricts an
arbitrator's authority to issue awards of any sort, including, presumably,
punitive damages. 97 Thus, though Mastrobuono's holding is apparently
narrow enough to allow for securities brokerage firms to preclude arbitral
awards of punitive damages with express and clear language in their
customer agreements, doing so may expose a member firm of the NASD to
sanctions by that body. 98
96 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 627. The Anti-Goren rules, as they
have been labeled, represent the reaction of the NASD and the other SROs to the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Roney & Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1989). There the
court held that when an agreement between a securities broker or dealer and its
customers specified a specific arbitral forum as the exclusive forum in which disputes
might be arbitrated, such provisions would be enforced. See id. at 1223. In Goren, the
customer agreement signed between Roney & Co. (a securities brokerage firm) and
Goren specified the NYSE arbitration panel as the exclusive arbitral forum to which
disputes would be presented. See id. at 1219. In light of that contractual provision, the
Sixth Circuit declined to allow Goren to proceed with the claim she filed against Roney
& Co. with an NASD arbitration panel. See id. The court wrote that "the customer's
ability to demand arbitration before the arbitral panel of his choice dictates that he is
equally free to agree to limit his recourse to a particular forum." Id. at 1223; see also
Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 627-28 (discussing Goren, 875 F.2d at 1223).
97 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 627. In the words of the NASD,
Section 21(f)(4) of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, as amended, prohibits the use
in any customer agreement of any language that (a) limits or contradicts the rules
of the NASD or any other self-regulatory organization; (b) limits the ability of a
party to file a claim in arbitration; or (c) limits the ability of the arbitrators to
make an award under the arbitration rules of a self-regulatory organization and
applicable law.
National Assoc. of See. Dealers, Inc., NASD Notice to Members 95-16, Predispute
Arbitration Clauses in Customer Agreements (1995), available in 1995 NASD LEXIS
28, Fedsec Library, Notice File (emphasis added). Given this rule, the effect of the
Anti-Goren rules, then, is to preclude securities firms from seeking to preclude
arbitrators from issuing "any award," which category would certainly include punitive
damages. See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 627.
98 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 630. Though securities firms are
faced with the dilemma described here, Kaufman and Cooney pose the question of the
significance of the fact that Mastrobuono was decided six years after the time at which
'the Anti-Goren rules were encrusted into the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. See id. On
the other hand, they also cite the fact that the SEC commented on the reach of the Anti-
Goren rules as follows: "Agreements cannot be used to curtail any rights that a party
may otherwise have had in a judicial forum. If punitive damages or attorneys fees would
be available under applicable law, then the agreement cannot limit parties' rights to
229
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3. The Status of the Law in the Wake of Mastrobuono
Thus, the current status of the law regarding the authority of securities
arbitrators to issue awards of punitive damages can be summarized as
follows: "It would now appear that the law, even in New York courts, is to
follow Mastrobuono and allow punitive damage awards in arbitration,
despite a New York choice-of-law clause and even if both parties are New
York residents, unless the parties' agreement unequivocally rules them
out." 99 But the real question, and the one to which the discussion must now
turn, is whether such arbitral awards are proper and fair. A number of
commentators have suggested that arbitrators always should be equipped
with the authority to issue punitive awards when they see fit (even in the
face of an agreement by the parties to an arbitration to allow New York law
to control the outcome of disputes) and in keeping with that position, they
have further contended that Mastrobuono was correctly decided. 100 In part,
this may be due to the perception that "while punitive damages are often
sought by customers against their brokerage firms ... they are rarely
awarded." 101 Yet the facts belie this assessment.102 Several state and
request them, nor arbitrators' rights to award them." See id. at 628-29 (quoting Order
Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of
Predispute Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26,805, 54 Fed. Reg.
21,144, 21,154 (1989)). With that, the SEC lent the weight of its authority-no mean
force-to the Anti-Goren rules.
99 Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 460. It is suggested that the
Mastrobuono decision eliminated any barriers to punitive damage awards in an
arbitration context in all of the federal circuits and apparently in the state courts as well.
See id. at 457.
100 See, e.g., Denise M. Barton, Comment, The Evolution of Punitive Damage
Awards in Securities Arbitration: Has the Use of Punitive Damages Rendered the
Arbitration Forum Inequitable?, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1537, 1561 (1996). Barton argues that
in order to ensure that securities violations be curtailed,
arbitrators need flexible and effective weapons .... Given that the perpetrators of
these offenses commit the same violations as their predecessors and ingeniously
devise new means to circumvent the securities laws and regulations, it is clear that
the fines and penalties imposed in the past have not been an effective means of
deterrence.
Id.
101 Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 17.
102 See Lansing & Bailey, supra note 1, at 206 (recounting the findings of a study
commissioned by the SEC that securities arbitrators are prone to issue punitive damages
against securities brokers and dealers, while litigants in the court system " received $0
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federal courts have allowed for arbitral awards of punitive damages. 10 3
This trend towards judicial confirmation of arbitral authority to issue
punitive damages begs the question of whether they are either desirable or
in keeping with constitutional due process requirements.
II. THE ISSUANCE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE THEATER OF
SECURITIES ARBITRATION CONSTITUTES STATE ACTION
The question of whether awards of punitive damages in the context of
securities arbitration are bounded by the limitations set forth in the United
States Constitution's due process guarantees ultimately turns upon the
answer to the threshold question of whether the issuer of the award is a
state actor. 104 Absent state action on the part of the arbitrator, then, the
of $55,075,000 claimed in punitive/treble damages").
103 See Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 458-62. Neesemann and Nelson
note that though the initial reaction of the New York state courts was to disregard
Mastrobuono and adhere to the Garrily rule when presented with customer agreements
containing New York choice-of-law clauses, there since have been six New York state
cases in which the courts confirmed an arbitral award of punitive damages. See id.
(citing, inter alia, Americorp Sec., Inc. v. Sager, 656 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997); Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Fisch, 661 N.Y.S.2d 31, 33 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997); Mulder v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 648 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537-38 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996); and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Adler, 651
N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)). In addition, all but one of the federal courts
seated in New York have allowed for punitive damages to be issued by an arbitrator.
See id. at 461. Thus, it can no longer be asserted that arbitrators rarely issue punitive
awards or that state and federal courts are unwilling to uphold them.
104 The state action doctrine maintains that the due process constraints set forth in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bind only those private persons whose actions
proceed under color of governmental authority to deprive another of his life, liberty, or
property. See JoHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrUTONAL LAW § 12.1
(5th ed. 1995). In order to determine whether a private person has deprived another of
his constitutional rights to due process with state action, a twofold inquiry must be
made. First, it must be determined whether "the claimed constitutional deprivation
resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority."
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (holding that a
private party to a court proceeding engaged in state action when he used preemptory
challenges to ensure that racial minorities be kept from participation on a jury, and thus
that he violated their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under
the law). Second, it must be determined "whether the private party charged with the
deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor." Id. Securities arbitrators
and their decisions to issue punitive damage awards fall within the rubric of both of
these descriptions.
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person or firm against whom punitive damages are leveled in a securities
arbitration proceeding unquestionably remains vulnerable thereto. Unless
state action is present, persons engaged in securities arbitration remain
uncloaked in the due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Thus, our inquiry necessarily begins with a determination of
whether the securities arbitrator can be described "in all fairness" as a state
actor. 105
The Supreme Court has set forth a three-pronged test for evaluating
whether a person's actions fall within the rubric of "state action." 10 6 The
first of the three factors to be considered is "the extent to which the actor
relies on governmental assistance and benefits .... " 107 The second asks
"whether the actor is performing a traditional government
function .... " 108 And the third considers "whether the injury caused is
aggravated in a unique way by the inciden[ce] of government authority." 109
As is argued below, when a securities arbitrator makes an award of
punitive damages, he qualifies as a state actor because (1) he relies on
governmental assistance in issuing the award; (2) he is engaged in what
historically has been considered a governmental function; and (3) the
deprivation of property that awards of punitive damages necessarily entail
is an injury aggravated by the fact of government authority. Put another
way, securities arbitrators act as state actors when they make'arbitral
awards of punitive damages because all three prongs of the Edmonson test
are satsified.
A. Governmental Assistance and Benefits
1. The NASD's Power to "Self-Regulate" the Securities Industry
Stems Solely from the Authority of the Federal Government
Securities arbitrators engage in state action when they issue awards of
punitive damages in part because they rely to a large extent upon
105 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620.
106 See id. Note, however, that each of the three prongs constitutes only a factor to
be considered in the state action analysis, rather than a bright-line test for the same. In
other words, that one factor is or is not satisfied is not dispositive on the issue of
whether state action is present. See id.
107Id. at 621.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 622.
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"governmental assistance and benefits" in doing so. 110 It is the authority of
federal law that compels securities brokerage firms to submit to punitive
damage awards, irrespective of their fairness.111 Unless securities brokers
comply with congressional mandates that require them to become members
of SROs, and specifically the NASD, their only option, as the Federal
District Court for the Middle District of Florida recognized, is to "choose
not to participate in the securities business." 112 NASD rules then compel
each member firm to arbitrate any disputes that should arise between itself
and customers or employees. 113 Thus, it is essentially federal law that
compels the arbitration of securities disputes between brokers and their
customers or employees. "The logic is straightforward: (1) the [Securities]
Exchange Act mandates that securities firms be members of the NASD, an
entity- created by Congress, and (2) the [Securities and Exchange
Commission], a government regulatory agency, made effective the NASD
rule ordering its member firms to arbitrate all of their disputes." 114
The NASD is a creature of congressional creation, and the United
States Code is the fountainhead from which power over its members
springs. The Congress enacted laws which make registration in an SRO
"registered pursuant to section 78o-3 of [Title 15 of the United States
Code]" a prerequisite to trading in securities. 1 5 However, the NASD is the
lone SRO that satisfies this requirement, meaning that if a firm seeks to
broker securities, it must first become a member of the'NASD. 116 As such,
110 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 653.
111 See id.
112 Park v. First Union Brokerage Servs., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1085, 1090 (M.D.
Fla. 1996) (holding-erroneously, in the opinion of this writer-that securities firms
enter into arbitration procedures strictly of their own volition and therefore, that they
are not compelled to arbitrate claims against them by state action).
113 See NASD CODE OF ARBmrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10301(a) (National Assoc.
of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999).
114 Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 652.
115 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(8) (1994); see also Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at
648-49.
116 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 648 n.271 (citing Willis H. Riccio,
Disciplinary Proceedings Before the NASD, R.I. B.J., Oct. 1992, at 21, 21). Though
the NASD is the only association of brokers and dealers registered pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 78o, there were ten other SROs registered as exchanges pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f as of 1992. See id. Section 78f provides for the registration of securities
exchanges with the SEC, and maintains that the Commission "may prescribe ... the
rules of the exchange and such other information and documents as the Commission, by
rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
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securities brokers and brokerage firms have no alternative, (other than to
close their doors) to membership in the NASD.
Furthermore, it is not only the creation of the NASD that is a product
of federal law; its ongoing authority to regulate its members likewise is
effectuated and undergirded by no less an authority than the United States
Code.1 17 Section 78o-3(b)(2) requires that any securities association
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to
§ 78o-3, which is to say the NASD alone, be equipped with the power to
force compliance, inter alia, with "the rules of the association." 118 The
Second Circuit recognized as much when it described the NASD as "a
registered national securities association with congressionally delegated
self-regulatory authority," which translates into a "mandated to secure
compliance by its members with the federal securities laws as well as its
own regulations .... -119 Federal law then imparts that power upon the
NASD by requiring that its rules contain provisions to "appropriately
discipline ." its members and persons associated with its members... by
expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and operations,
fine, censure, being suspended or barred from being associated with a
member, or any other fitting sanction." 120 And it is a federal agency that
oversees the rules of the NASD and the other SROs. For this reason, the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized that the SEC effectually
controls the activities of the NASD as well as the other SROs with
unbending authority. 12' Absent this foundation in federal law, the NASD
would remain a paper tiger. But the fact remains that Congress has given
protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a).
117 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 650.
118 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(2).
119 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Ass'n of See.
Dealers, Inc., 616 F.2d 1363, 1365 (2d Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit has offered a
similar description of the NASD: 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) "gives the [NASD] the
power to discipline its members who fail to conform to the standard of conduct
established by the organization. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h) (1976). 'The Act also authorizes
the SEC to exercise a significant oversight function over the rules and activities of the
registered associations."' First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 691, 693 (3d
Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S.
694, 700-01 (1975)).
120 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7).
121 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34
(1987) (holding that claims against securities brokers and dealers by their customers
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable); see also
Lansing & Bailey, supra note 1, at 204.
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the NASD and the rules-it promulgates sharp teeth, standing at the ready to
bring the full weight of the U.S. government down upon the shoulders of
any brokerage firm that fails to abide by its rules.
Those rules include a requirement that securities firms arbitrate all
disputes. 122 The SEC has approved an NASD rule 123 dictating that
[a]ny dispute, claim or controversy... between a customer and a
member and/or associated person arising in connection with the business
of such member or in connection with activities of such associated persons
shall be arbitrated under this Code, as provided by any duly executed and
enforceable written agreement or upon demand of the customer. 124
Therefore, any broker that refuses to arbitrate disputes with customers will
be subject to the wrath of NASD disciplinary measures (including expulsion
therefrom), which in turn are imbued with the force of federal law. In the
end, the authority of the state, though acting through a private organization,
is the force that impels securities firms into the arbitral arena and obligates
them to abide by the decisions of the arbitrators, regardless of whether the
brokerage firm would have resolved a particular dispute through
arbitration. 125
That the NASD and the arbitration rules it promulgates operate under a
banner of federal law, and indeed, wholly as a result of it, is a point that
has not been lost on the courts. 126 The Fifth Circuit said the following in
regards to the NASD:
It is the only registered securities association under the Exchange
Act .... As a registered securities association, it has been "delegated
governmental power in order to enforce, at its own initiative, compliance
by members of the industry with both the legal requirements laid down in
122 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 651 (concluding that although the
decision to require "Customer Agreements" with the brokerage firm is "ultimately a
policy decision to be made by each securities firm," such firms will, in practice, settle
conflicts almost exclusively in arbitral fora since the NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure makes "arbitration, as a means of resolving disputes, practically
unavoidable").
123 See id. By approving the NASD rule, of course, the SEC reinforced the federal
law already buttressing the NASD's power to regulate and discipline its members.
124 NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10301(a) (National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999) (emphasis added).
125 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 651.
126 See id.
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the Exchange Act and ethical standards beyond those requirements. "127
The Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee reached the
same conclusion, finding that though the NASD is a private organization, it
"arbitrated the dispute and awarded punitive damages against the
defendant, and it did so within the framework of federal regulation and
approval."' 128 Even though the Federal District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee ultimately rejected a theory holding that securities
arbitrators engage in state action when they issue punitive awards, the
judicial branch nonetheless has made a strong case in support of that
proposition.
Likewise, the legislative arm of the federal government seems to
concur. The 1975 Senate Report regarding the then-proposed amendments
of that year to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 recognized "that the
self-regulatory organizations utilize governmental-type powers in carrying
out their responsibilities," and that as a result, "these organizations must be
made to conform their activities to the fundamental standards of due
process." 129 To be sure, the Senate emphasized in its report that the term
"self-regulatory organization" is a misnomer, leading to the fallacious
conclusion that it is the securities industry acting of its own accord, rather
than in tandem with the federal government, that polices securities dealers
and exchanges. 130 "Such a conception of self-regulation," the Senators
wrote, "is seriously misleading in that it fails to recognize the essential and
continuing role of the federal government." 131 That is to say, the Congress
127 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 616 F.2d 1363, 1367 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-75, at 23
(1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 201) (emphasis added).
128 Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709, at
*10 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994), aff'd, 83 F.3d 132 (6th Cir. 1996).
129 S. REP. No. 94-75, at 23. The Senate Report further stated that "[tihe self-
regulatory organizations exercise government power. ... " Id. at 201.
130 Id. (stating that any school of thought which adheres to the belief that the
securities industry is entirely autonomous and self-regulating, as distinguished from
being subject to regulation by the federal government via private organizations, ignores
the realities of the interdependence of the NASD and the authority of federal law, as
"[i]ndustry regulation and government regulation are not alternatives, but
complementary components of the self-regulatory process"); see also Kaufman &
Cooney, supra note 31, at 653.
131 See S. RFP. No. 94-75, at 23. It seems obvious that the cited passages make
clear the Senate's view that the NASD is a state actor, taking on its regulatory role as
an extension of state authority.
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seems to recognize the state action element that inheres in all of the
NASD's regulations and disciplinary proceedings.
Perhaps most telling of all is that the SEC adopted the view that the
NASD's requirements that members resolve all disputes in an arbitral
forum carry "the force of federal law." 132 The NASD went even one step
further when it stated that arbitral awards of punitive damages by securities
arbitrators are a public function, 133 and therefore constitute state action. In
addition, the NASD set forth its assessment of arbitral awards of punitive
damages as easily distinguishable from arbitral awards of punitive damages
stemming from private agreements to arbitrate disputes on grounds that
federal law compels securities brokers to become members of a securities
association, while private parties enter agreements to arbitrate strictly of
their own volition. 134 The logical extension of this rationale is, of course,
that the NASD's requirements constitute state action. 135
2. Because the NASD Acts with the Authority of Federal Law, Its
Requirement That Member Firms Arbitrate All Disputes
Constitutes State Action
Because the NASD is accorded by federal law the power to force
securities dealers to become members therein and then to require, at
132 Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 655 (citing Brief for the SEC at 1 n.1,
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (No. 94-18)). The
SEC's amicus brief in Mastrobuono cites 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1994) as support for
the proposition that the "[arbitration rules of the NASD] carr[y] the force of federal
law." Id. That provision maintains that the NASD must promulgate a series of rules for
the governance of its members that will, inter alia, protect investors and the public
interest. Because those rules, set forth at the behest of federal law, operate to compel
member firms into the arbitral arena, the SEC has rightly concluded that -securities
dealers enter into arbitration proceedings not because they have been prompted to do so
by the "self-regulation" of the NASD, but because they have been prompted to do so by
the federal government acting through the NASD. See id.
133 See Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 478 n.31.
134 See id. at 478 n.31. The NASD's self assessment as an extension of
governmental authority is, in effect, an acknowledgment that "self-regulation" is a
misleading term and a clear statement that its authority over securities brokers derives
from federal law rather than the intrinsic power of the SRO itself.
135 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (stating that
whenever a person or association "act[s] together with or has obtained significant aid
from state officials," that person's or association's actions are fairly attributable to the
state).
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penalty of expulsion, member firms to arbitrate "any dispute, claim, or
controversy ... between a customer and a member and/or associated
person arising in connection with the business of such member or in
connection with the activities of such associated persons," 136 this
compulsion constitutes state action subject to the due process requirements
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 137 In determining whether state
action on the part of a private actor exists, "the inquiry must be whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself."1 38  Arguably, in deciding
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,139 the Supreme Court
already has found a close nexus between the regulatory activity of the SEC
and the arbitral activities of the various SROs, including the NASD. 140 The
McMahon Court described the authority of the SEC over the arbitration
procedures instituted by the SROs as "expansive," stating:
No proposed rule change may take effect unless the SEC finds that the
proposed rule is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange
Act... ; and the Commission has the power, on its own initiative, to
abrogate, add to, and delete from any SRO rule if it finds such changes
necessary or appropriate to further the objectives of the Act .... In
short, the Commission has broad authority to oversee and to regulate the
rules adopted by the SROs relating to customer disputes, including the
power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure
that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights. 141
136 NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10301(a) (National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999).
137 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (holding that there exists state action when private
conduct is sufficiently bound up with the force of the state, as in those instances, like
the actions of the NASD, in which an entity "act[s] together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials").
138 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (holding that a
utility company was not a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
139 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
140 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 654 (stating that "[iun 1987, the
Supreme Court specifically cited the exceptional governmental involvement in the
affairs of SROs as determinative of why SROs should be allowed to arbitrate their
disputes").
141 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233 (citations omitted) (holding, inter alia, that
customers' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996), claims against their securities brokers could be
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According to the Supreme Court, the SROs exercise "government-type
powers," 142 which, presumably, is a strong indication that the Court
regards the NASD as a state actor. 143
Moreover, awards of punitive damages in the context of securities
arbitration constitute state action because the government compels all
securities dealers to become members of the NASD.144 The import of this
observation lies largely in the fact that when the government requires
membership in an organization, the Supreme Court has indicated that the
organization is bound by the due process guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments with respect to the fees it exacts from and rules it
enforces against its members. 145 Extending that logic to the context of
securities arbitration, then, because the government compels all securities
satisfied within the context of the arbitral forum, and that consequently, the clause in the
securities brokerage firm's customer agreement mandating the arbitration of all disputes
was enforceable with regards to the customer's RICO claims for treble damages).
142 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 235 (citing S. RIP. No. 94-75, at 22 (1975), reprinted
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 201).
143 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 654-55.
144 See Peter M. Mundheim, Comment, The Desirability of Punitive Damages in
Securities Arbitration: Challenges Facing the Industry Regulators in the Wake of
Mastrobuono, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 197, 235 (1995). Mundheim contends, and I believe
rightly, that arbitral awards of punitive damages by securities arbitrators qualify as state
action for two reasons, the first being that which is cited above (i.e., because federal
law compels securities dealers to become members of an SRO). See id. The other is that
such issuance of punitive damages is a "public function," id., discussed at greater
length infra at Part III.B. Both of these are, of course, valid reasons in support of
Mundheim's conclusion, but they are not the exclusive reason that arbitral awards of
punitive damages by securities arbitrators are state action. See discussion infra Parts
m.B-n1I.c.
145 See Mundheim, supra note 144, at 235. Mundheim points to the Supreme
Court's decision in Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1990), for the proposition
that "[ijf the government forces membership in an organization, the organization's
procedures (in this case, SRO arbitration procedures) may not violate the Constitution,
just as procedures undertaken directly by the government cannot." Mundheim, supra
note 144, at 235. In Keller, the Supreme Court determined that because the State Bar
Association of California compelled attorneys practicing in that state to become
members of the bar and thus compelled the payment of bar dues thereto, those dues
could be used to fund activities connected with the regulation of the practice of law; the
Bar Association could not, however, spend compulsory dues to support political or
ideological causes or viewpoints without abridging the First Amendment rights of its
members. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 16. Put another way, because the Bar Association
compelled its members to join, it was bound to ensure that its members constitutional
rights remain intact. See id.
239
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
brokers or dealers to become members of the NASD, the NASD's rules
and procedures are bound by rigid standards of the Due Process Clauses as
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States.146 Furthermore, that
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the issuance of punitive damages
historically has remained within the exclusive purview of the state.
B. Punitive Damages Are a Traditional Government Function
The Supreme Court has described the issuance of punitive damages as,
traditionally, a function of the state. 147 In doing so, the Court observed that
"'[p]unitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort
law."' 148 This passage from Supreme Court jurisprudence does not
necessarily demand the conclusion that punitive damages are exclusively
within the purview of state authority, but it certainly tolerates it. In
addition, it serves to establish that punitive damages have been regarded as
a function of the state, as distinguished from private actors, even as far
back as Blackstone. 149 Furthermore, "[o]ne purpose of the rule of law is to
require that the use of coercion be controlled by the State." 150
In support of this view, it should be recognized that the issuance of
punitive damages historically has been considered as remaining within the
sole authority of the state precisely because their purpose is, in large part,
and as the name suggests, to punish the defendant rather than to
recompense the plaintiff for his injuries.' 5 ' Put another way, punishment is
a function of governmental authority. If it was not, "vigilante justice"
would be sound public policy, or at least there would exist no theoretical
justification for limiting it. But, as was noted above, "[flor centuries the
power to punish has been a monopoly of the State, and not that of any
private individual .... The day is long past since barbaric man achieved
redress by private punitive measures." 152
It was, in fact, for this reason that then-Justice Rehnquist advocated the
146 See infra Part IV.
147 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991).
148 Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984)).
149 See id. ("Blackstone appears to have noted their use.").
150 Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 796 (1976).
151 See Steven R. Salbu, Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies: Beyond
the Constitution, 49 FLA. L. REv. 247, 266 (1997) (noting that "one basic function of
punitive damages is retribution. The remedy's nomenclature is telling. We label certain
damages punitive because they are intended to punish...").
152 Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 796-97 (citations omitted).
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proposition that punitive fines should be paid to the state rather than to the
plaintiff, who was recompensed in whole through the mechanism of
compensatory damages. 153 Rehnquist's position is very much in keeping
with the manner in which punishment has been regarded throughout the
development of English and American law. 154 All phases of punishment,
from its imposition to its execution, have remained a power of the state
since the days during which the Magna Carta was drafted, and indeed,
since time immemorial. 155 In a more modem context, given that punitive
damages are designed to punish the wrongdoer rather than to make the
plaintiff whole, "it is anamolous to private recovery of the punishment.
The theoretical justification for the punishment suggests that punitive
153 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 602-03. For example, after the
Normans crossed the English Channel to bring the Saxons (who, prior to that point,
enjoyed control over England) to their knees in the Battle of Hastings in i066, they
established a system of law in England in which no clear demarcation was made
between civil and criminal law. Monetary punishments for breaches of the law, then,
were payable to the state rather than to the aggrieved individual, regardless of the
offense. See id.
155 See id. at 602-04. Kaufman and Cooney observe that in Norman England,
"individuals who had committed a wrong were considered to have offended the crown."
Id. at 602. Therefore, when punitive fines, then called "amercements," were leveled
against the wrongdoer, they were paid to the Crown, which is to say the state. See id. at
603. Later, to ensure that the size of the amercement was not excessive, a chapter of the
Magna Carta was devoted to the establishment of standards for the application of
amercements. See id. As a result, the size of the amercement was determined by a
court, and subsequently by a group of the wrongdoer's peers, but always under the
supervision of governmental authority. See id. at 603-04. This historical record
provides substantial evidence that since the days to which the American legal system
traces it roots, punishment has been viewed as a thing administered by the state rather
than the individual. Likewise, Justice O'Connor's assumption that punitive damages are
and always were within the sole province of state authority underlies her historical
exposition of their development in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). There she stated that "[tihe link between the gradual
disappearance of the amercement and the emergence of punitive damages provides
strong historical support for applying the Excessive Fines Clause [of the Eighth
Amendment] to awards of punitive damages." See id. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). There is evidenced in that passage an assumption that
punitive damages are functions of state authority because, were they not issued by state
actors, then, of course, there would be no basis for applying the Excessive Fines
Clause, or any other clause, of the Constitution. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
104, § 12.1.
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damages ought to be paid to the state and not to a private party." 156 The
point is simply that if there exists no theoretical justification for allowing
private parties to retain the fines spawned by their injuries, nor any
historical justification for doing so, there is not nor has there ever been,
under the American rule of law, a justification for allowing private parties
to exact fines from each other. 157
For these reasons, the Supreme Court, on more than a single occasion,
has characterized the imposition of punitive damages as a species of
punishment to be imposed and enforced by state authority. 158 Justice
O'Connor nearly equated the criminal punishment function of state
authority with the imposition of punitive damages when she wrote, "[t]he
character of a sanction imposed as punishment 'is not changed by the mode
in which it is inflicted, whether by a civil action or a criminal
prosecution.'" 159 The pertinent point here, though, is that if such a penalty
"is punishment," 160 and its character cannot be altered by removing it from
one context and placing it in another, then this form of penalty called
punitive damages is essentially of the same species as criminal sanctions.
Criminal sanctions are "undeniably the province of the State," 161 thus
giving rise to the Supreme Court's definition of punitive damages as
"private fines levied by civil juries." 162
The fundamental rule of contract law, providing that the parties to a
contractual agreement are not permitted to determine punishments in the
event of a breach, is based on similar foundations. Rather, such
punishments are to be determined by the state and not by the aggrieved
private individual.
156 Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some
Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1233, 1270 (1987).
157 See id. (concluding that even the deterrence argument in favor of punitive
damage awards "offers absolutely no justification for the private recovery of these
financial punishments, nor does it address the issue of legal limitations upon the size of
such punishments").
158 See, e.g., United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611 (1880).
159 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 298 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Chouteau, 102 U.S. at 611).
160 Id. ("[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can be explained only as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment") (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
161 Kaufinan & Cooney, supra note 31, at 660.
162 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); see also Kaufman &
Cooney, supra note 31, at 659-60.
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[I]n general parties are free to enter into a contract containing whatever
terms they wish regarding the establishment of primary rights, but except
within narrow limits they are not free to determine what remedial rights
will be provided. Remedies are provided by the state and are defined by
public rather than private law. 163
And again, the only conclusion available is that punitive damages are and
traditionally have been premised on state authority.
In sum, punitive damages have, throughout the legal history of England
and the United States, been seated exclusively within the capacity of the
state. As such, the leveling of punitive awards satisfies the second of the
Edmonson factors. Accordingly, those persons or bodies issuing punitive
damages should be regarded as state actors.
C. Aggravation by the Fact of Government Authority
The third of the Edmonson factors for ascertaining state action asks
whether "the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the
inciden[ce] of governmental authority." 164 Almost without question, the
issuance of arbitral awards of punitive damages aggravated- and indeed
was made possible by-the incidence of governmental authority. Not only
are securities dealers forced into arbitral proceedings by the NASD, and
thus the authority of federal law, 165 but when arbitral awards of punitive
damages are challenged by those against whom they were leveled, it is the
state's authority in the form of the public justice system that enforces
them. 166 Moreover, judicial confirmation of arbitral awards is expressly
provided for in the language of the FAA.' 67 It would, presumably, not be
possible absent such confirmation from the corridors of state power. And in
Shelly v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court's awareness of an injury's
aggravation by judicial enforcement (i.e., governmental action) prompted it
to write that "[s]tate action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all its
forms." 168 Therefore, when arbitral awards of punitive damages are issued
163 JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PEI.LO, CONTRACTS § 14-31 (3d ed. 1987)
(emphasis added).
16 4 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
165 See supra Part III.A.
166 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 660.
167 See id.
168 Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (referring to a type of state power
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against securities brokers and dealers, they are "aggravated in a unique
way by the inciden[ce] of governmental authority." 169 In many cases, such
awards could not have been executed absent state action in the form of
judicial enforcement.
Having run arbitral punitive damage awards through the Edmonson
state action calculus, it cannot be denied that under the test articulated in
that decision, arbitrators and arbitral panels that issue punitive damages
against one of the parties before them can be described "in all fairness" as
state actors. Their authority to do so derives from federal law, the issuance
of punitive damages is a traditional government function, and the injury
(deprivation of property) is aggravated in a unique way by judicial
enforcement of the award. Each of these conclusions satisfies one of the
Edmonson factors, such that in the aggregate they form the basis for
placing arbitral awards of punitive damages within the securities context
under the rubric of state action.170 As state actors, then, securities
arbitrators issuing punitive damages are bound by the due process
guarantees of the federal Constitution.1 71
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
Due process operates to secure the constitutionality of punitive damage
awards. Such procedural protections ensure that persons are not arbitrarily
deprived of their property. 172 Thus, the threat of an arbitrary deprivation of
property intrinsic to any award of punitive damages 173 mandates that any
state actor who issues them against a private party be bound by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 174 Because securities
arbitrators issuing punitive damages are engaged in state action, they must
abide by the procedural protections set forth in the Supreme Court's
that took the form of judicial enforcement of a restrictive easement against home
ownership by African Americans; the Court determined that this was state action writ
large and thus a violation of the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment).
169 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622.
170 See id.
171 See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 104, § 12.1(a).
172 See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1994).
173 See id. at 432 (noting that "[plunitive damages pose an acute danger of
arbitrary deprivation of property").
174 See id. at 434-35. ("A decision to punish a tortfeasor by means of an exaction
of exemplary damages is an exercise of state power that must comply with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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jurisprudence treating punitive damage awards. 175 In turn, this gives rise to
a survey of the requirements for procedural protections on punitive awards
articulated by the Court.
A. The Foundation-Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity of those
methods of assessing punitive damages that limit the discretion of the jury
in determining the size of the award and provide for a series of reviews of
the same. 176 Traditionally, punitive damages have been awarded by a jury
only after it has been instructed to.consider the twofold purpose of punitive
damages, retribution and deterrence, and the award is then subjected to
reviews at both the trial and appellate levels. 177 The Court observed that
jury instructions establishing guidelines for assessment. of punitive awards
according to the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and
the necessity for deterrence operate to ensure that jury discretion was "not
unlimited" and "confined to deterrence and retribution."17 8 The Court
reasoned that so long as these constraints upon jury discretion were
effectuated, constitutional due process hurdles had been overcome. 179 The
Court also made note of the post-trial procedures executed by the trial
judge to ensure the fairness of exemplary awards. That the trial judge was
required to set forth in the record a detailed exposition of several factors
contributing to the justice of awarding punitive damages in the amount
assessed by the jury contributed to the award's conformity with the
constitutional due process guarantees.' 80 Finally, the Court did not leave
unnoticed the fact of appellate review of punitive awards as yet another
175 See supra Part m.
176 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (establishing
the Court's long history of approving the common-law method of assessing punitive
damage awards).
177 See id.
178 Id. at 19.
179 See id. at 20 ("As long as the [jury's] discretion is exercised within reasonable
constraints, due process is satisfied.").
180 See id. The factors considered by the trial judge, and recorded in his opinion,
were the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct, the need for deterrence of the
defendant's conduct, the impact of the award upon the parties to the action as well as
innocent third parties, and other factors. The Court then noted that this test "ensures
meaningful and adequate review by the trial court whenever a jury has fixed the punitive
damages." Id.
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check upon both the jury's and the trial court's discretion to award them as
well as the amount of the award itself.181 Thus, in Haslip the Court was
able to conclude that the guarantees of Due Process Clause had been met
because "(1) the trial court gave the jury instructions on factors it should
consider in making the award, (2) the trial judge stated his reasons for
upholding the award in the record, and (3) the appellate court followed
specific guidelines to determine whether the award was reasonable." 182
Absent these procedural protections, however, it is not clear that the Court
would have reached the same result.
B. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg- Process Matters
When, however, punitive damages are awarded without an adherence
to the procedures for their assessment discussed and endorsed in Haslip, the
Court has indicated that their issuance falls beyond the bounds of that
which is constitutionally permissible. "[A] jury award [of punitive
damages] may not be upheld ... if it was reached in proceedings lacking
the basic elements of fundamental fairness." 183 Thus, in Honda Motor Co.
v. Oberg, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an amendment to the
Oregon Constitution barring judicial review of the size of punitive damage
awards unless "the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to
support the verdict." 184 The Court framed the issue in Oberg not as
whether a punitive award of a particular size would violate the
Constitution, 185 but as "the question of what procedures are necessary to
ensure that punitive damages are not imposed in an arbitrary manner. More
specifically," the Court went on, "the question is whether the Due Process
Clause requires judicial review of the amount of punitive damages
awards." 186 The manner in which the Court described the issue in this case
suggests that the fundamental question underlying the analysis of the
181 See id. at 20-21 (stating that "appellate review makes certain that the punitive
damages are reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish
what has occurred and to deter its repetition").
182 Mundheim, supra note 144, at 235.
183 Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276
(1989).
184 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994).
185 Previously, in Haslip, the Court had noted that it "need not, and indeed [it]
cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case." Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
186 Oberg, 512 U.S. at 420.
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constitutionality of punitive damage awards is not whether the size of the
award itself comports with the Fourteenth Amendment, but instead whether
the procedures employed to arrive at the award comport with the due
process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, the concern of the Oberg Court was not with the size of
the punitive award the jury leveled against Honda. Instead, it was
concerned with the lack of adequate review given it by both the trial and
appellate courts under the Oregon Constitution. 187 "What we are concerned
with is the possibility that a culpable defendant may be unjustly punished;
evidence of culpability warranting some punishment is not a substitute for
evidence providing at least a rational basis for the particular deprivation of
property imposed by the State to deter future wrongdoing." 188 The manner
in which to ensure that there exists a "rational basis for the particular
deprivation of property" is through procedural devices by which to
administer punitive awards. Specifically, judicial review is the mechanism
that guards against arbitrary deprivations of property via the imposition of
unlawful punitive damages. 189 But "Oregon has removed that safeguard
without providing any substitute procedure. . . ."190 For that reason, the
Court invalidated the Oregon law dispensing with the procedural
protections against arbitrary exemplary awards. 191 More generally, the
Court stated that it would not hesitate to declare invalid any proceeding
from which the adequate procedural safeguards against "arbitrary and
inaccurate adjudication" had been excised. 192 Therefore, in view of the
Court's opinion in Oberg, it would seem that an imposition of punitive
damages by a state actor is an unconstitutional deprivation of property
absent adequate judicial review of the award or some substitute but
equivalent procedure to guard against arbitrary punishments.
187 See id. (surveying its prior decisions respecting punitive damage awards, the
Court reiterated the emphasis that it had placed upon the "availability of both
'meaningful and adequate review by the trial court' and subsequent appellate
review" (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20)).
188 Id. at 429.
189 See id. at 432.
190 Id.
191 See id.
192 See id. at 430 (citing, inter alia, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
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C. Process and Punitives in Securities Arbitration
With these considerations in mind, it is doubtful that awards of
exemplary damages by securities arbitrators could be regarded as consistent
with the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
None of the procedures set forth in Haslip or Oberg-narrowed jury
discretion, judicial review, or appellate review- is available to the parties
before an arbitration panel that issues punitive damages. Nor is a substitute
procedure available to accord the parties to an arbitration the procedural
guarantees of the Constitution. Yet the Supreme Court's decisions in Oberg
and Haslip indicate that without those procedural protections, punitive
awards contravene the Fourteenth Amendment.
A number of courts have enumerated grave concerns regarding the
constitutionality of arbitral awards of punitive damages, largely for the
reasons outlined in Haslip and Oberg.'93 Formulation of the Garrity rule,
for instance, was motivated by these concerns:
[P]unitive damages take their shape from the subjective criteria involved in
attitudes toward correction and reform, and courts do not accept readily
the delegation of that kind of power. Where punitive damages have been
allowed for those torts which are still regarded somewhat as public penal
wrongs as well as actionable private wrongs, they have had rather close
judicial supervision. If the usual rules were followed, there would be no
effective supervision over punitive awards in arbitration. 194
193 In addition, a dissenting opinion in the California Supreme Court's decision in
Moore v. Conliffe highlighted a number of concerns regarding what its author
considered to be the procedural shortcomings of arbitral awards in general. Among
them were the following: (1) perjury is deterred in judicial proceedings by the fact that
they are public proceedings, while arbitral proceedings are purely private; (2)
arbitrators may be dependent upon the parties for payment and are not required to take
an oath of fairness or impartiality, while a judge and jury are neutral decisionmakers;
(3) in arbitration, there is no requirement that witnesses be sworn to tell the truth unless
one of the parties requests it; (4) because discovery is reduced, if allowed at all in
arbitration, the ability of one of the parties to mount an effective cross-examination
against the other is never certain; (5) no record of the arbitral proceeding need be kept,
which translates into the fact that the proceeding is not subject to postdecision scrutiny
by third parties, thereby insulating witnesses from public exposure should they decide to
lie on the stand; and (6) the parties to an arbitral proceeding do not have access to
judicial review for insufficiency of credible evidence. See Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d
204, 222-23 (Cal. 1994) (Baxter, J., dissenting).
194 Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. 1976) (emphasis
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Judge Beam of the Eighth Circuit echoed the same sentiments:
In the arbitration setting we have almost none of the protections that
fundamental fairness and due process require for the imposition of
[punitive damages]. Discovery is abbreviated if available at all. The rules
of evidence are employed, if at all, in a very relaxed manner. The
factfinders... operate with almost none of the controls and safeguards
assumed in Haslip.195
Moreover, judicial review of punitive awards under the terms of the
FAA is likewise so restricted as to have been rendered virtually
meaningless. 196 The FAA permits judges to vacate an arbitral award of
punitive damages only if (1) the award was the product of "corruption,
fraud, or undue means"; (2) the arbitrators evidenced "partiality or
corruption" in issuing the award; (3) the arbitrators engaged in
"misconduct" in refusing to postpone a hearing or to hear evidence, or for
any other "misbehavior" in doing so; and (4) the arbitrators exceeded their
powers. 197 The scope of review of arbitral awards is so confined, in fact,
that the Second Circuit wrote that it "[had] made it quite clear on earlier
occasions that it is the function neither of this [C]ourt nor of the district
courts to review the record of arbitration proceedings for errors of law or
fact." 198 In a similar vein, the Central District of Illinois wrote in regards
to the FAA, "[t]he court's power to vacate an arbitrator's award is severely
restricted by [the FAA] and by the strong national policy favoring the
resolution of grievances through arbitration where the parties have agreed
to be bound by an arbitrator's determination."1 99 Most telling of all was
this comment from the Seventh Circuit: "[j]udicial review of arbitration
awards is tightly limited; perhaps it [should] not be called 'review' at
all.,,200
As was indicated above, the absence of meaningful judicial review is
not the only procedural (and therefore constitutional) shortcoming of
added).
195 Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 889 (8th Cir. 1993) (Beam, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
196 See Mundheim, supra note 144, at 237.
197 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (1994).
198 Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d
Cir. 1967).
199 In re Zeigler Coal Co., 484 F. Supp. 445, 446 (C.D. Ill. 1980).
200 Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 640 (quoting Baravati v. Josephthal,
Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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arbitral awards of punitive damages by securities arbitrators. Coupled with
the fact that judicial review of arbitral awards is seldom an option for the
parties, arbitration is by definition not bound by the rules of evidence,
courtroom procedure, or the substantive rules of law.20 1 In consequence,
arbitrators tend to consider a vast menu of nebulous, imprecise, and largely
unknowable factors, all based upon "basic notions of fairness and justice,
in making their decisions in the cases placed before them." 202 And because
arbitrators are rarely if ever required to set forth the bases for their
resolution of conflicts submitted to arbitration, 20 3 the possibility of error,
especially when assessing punitive damages, is not insubstantial. As one
commentator put it, "[i]n the proverbial language, you only get one bite at
the apple in arbitration, and the result is only as good as your
arbitrator. '"2 04 With the possibility of error so great, and the possibility of
meaningful judicial review so slim, these considerations would seem to
require the conclusion that punitive damage awards by securities arbitrators
are neither constitutional nor just.
This view is reinforced by the fact that arbitral awards of punitive
damages are an inadequate mechanism to effectuate the deterrence function
of punitive damages. In order that punitive damages operate to protect the
public by deterring others from engaging in the culpable behavior from
which the punitive damages award stemmed, it is necessary that reasons
underlying the award be made public. Otherwise, similarly situated persons
would be given no guidance as to the appropriate manner in which to tailor
their conduct. But arbitral awards, including punitive damage awards, are
rarely accompanied by an exposition of the arbitrator's reasons for issuing
the award or even the facts giving rise to the dispute. 205 Arbitral awards are
in many instances pronounced in a single line of text. The effect, of course,
is that arbitral awards of punitive damages are an ineffective and
inappropriate means of deterring egregious behavior by securities firms.20 6
Thus, suggestions that punitive damages are necessary "to combat the
increasing number of securities violations" are anamolous.20 7
201 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in
American Law, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1945, 1958 (1996).
202 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 643-44.
203 See Carbonneau, supra note 201, at 1958.
204 Id.
205 See Kaufman & Cooney, supra note 31, at 630-31.
206 See id.
207 Barton, supra note 100, at 1561.
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V. RESPONSES TO DuE PROCESS CONCERNS AND THEIR
FAILURE TO SECURE CONSISTENCY BETWEEN SECURITIES
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
In response to the due process concerns related to arbitral awards of
punitive damages highlighted above, a number of proposals have been
made to mitigate them. To take just one example (others will be discussed
in greater detail below), the Arbitration Policy Task Force of the NASD
has proposed that they be limited to "the lesser of two times compensatory
damages or $750,000."208 Many scholars and investors opposed its
approval. A number of commentators have suggested that such a cap on
arbitral punitive awards would hamstring arbitrators, removing their ability
effectively to sanction misconduct on the part of securities brokerage
firms. 209
The reality of the situation, however, paints a different picture. If the
due process guidelines for the imposition of punitive damages set forth by
the Supreme Court's Haslip and Oberg decisions are to serve as a guide,
the issue is not the size of a particular award, but rather, the process by
which it is assessed. 210 A cap on the size of arbitral awards of punitive
damages does nothing to mitigate the due process foibles intrinsic to
punitive awards by securities arbitrators, precisely because a punitive
award is not constitutionally permissible, irrespective of its size, if due
process requirements are not followed. 211
It is certainly true that "the Constitution imposes a substantive limit on
the size of punitive damage awards." 212 But the fact that the size of the
award has far fewer and far less important constitutional implications than
208 David S. Ruder, Elements of a Fair and Efficient Securities Arbitration System,
40 ARiz. L. Rav. 1101, 1107 (1998) (citing ARBrrRATION PoLicY TASK FORCE, supra
note 8, at 42).
209 See Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 40. Stipanowich criticizes the cap in part on
grounds that it was "struck among major players in securities industry arbitration
without significant participation of or support from investors and their representatives,"
id. at 40, and because it "will restrict arbitrators... and produce a result different than
that available in the public courts," id. at 44.
210 See supra Part IV.
211 See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994) (stating that if "the
absent procedures would have provided protection against arbitrary and inaccurate
adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the proceedings violative of due
process").
212 Id. at 420.
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does the process by which it was executed and reviewed is evidenced by
the Supreme Court's holding in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resource Corp.213 There the Supreme Court upheld a punitive damage
award of ten million dollars, which translated into an amount 526 times the
size of the compensatory damage award. 214 In spite of the exorbitant
amount, the Court upheld the punitive award because adequate procedures
had been followed so as to prevent an arbitrary deprivation of the
defendant's property. More specifically, the Court cited as a basis for its
ruling (1) that voir dire afforded the parties the opportunity to ensure an
impartial jury, (2) the jury assessed the size of the punitive damage award
after having listened to adversarial arguments from counsel for both
parties, (3) the jury reached its decision as a product of deliberations
concerning the evidence presented at trial, (4) the award was reviewed by
the trial judge, who affirmed it as standing in conformity with the evidence
presented at trial, and (5) the award was subjected to meaningful review by
an appellate court which affirmed the award unanimously. 215 The Court
observed, "[a]ssuming that fair procedures were followed, a judgment that
is [the] product of that process is entitled to a strong presumption of
validity. "216
None of these procedural protections are available in an arbitral forum.
Arbitral awards of punitive damages are not subjected to meaningful review
at any level, 217 and there is no counterpart to the voir dire in arbitration
which would guarantee that the parties are presenting their case to an
impartial panel of arbitrators. Thus, because the procedural guidelines
articulated by the 7XO Production Corp., Haslip, and Oberg Courts are not
followed in the arbitral setting, there can be no presumption of
constitutional validity when arbitration panels issue punitive awards. 218
Procedures designed to ensure that arbitral awards of punitive damages
comport with due process, while they might enshrine securities arbitration
in a procedural regime that may, arguably, be in keeping with the
Fourteenth Amendment, they necessarily impede the goals of, and the
incentives to, arbitration. One of the goals of arbitration is a quick and
213 509 U.S. 433 (1993).
214 See id. at 466.
215 See id. at 456-57.
216 Id. at 457.
217 See supra Part IV.C.
218 See TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 457.
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efficient resolution of disputes, 219 but to require arbitrators to draft opinions
or to subject their decisions to appeal cripples the effectiveness of the
operation. It is also assumed that arbitration of disputes between, securities
brokers and their customers will not result in the sometimes excessive
expenses associated with litigation in the public justice system.2 20 Again,
though, to require parties to appeal decisions of arbitrators would cause
arbitration expenses to multiply (especially for those parties who opt to be
represented by an attorney in front of the arbitration panel). Furthermore, a
series of appeals following every arbitral hearing from which punitive
damages flowed would diminish the finality of arbitral hearings that is often
cited as one of their benefits. 221
Though a number of proposals have been tabled for bringing arbitral
awards of punitive damages in line with the due process requirements of the
Constitution, none will serve adequately both the Constitution's demands
and the aims and benefits of the arbitration process. Adherence to
requirements of due process necessarily requires expenditures of time and
money. Efficiency is not the aim of the due process of the law, and, in fact,
remains contrary to its goal of protecting rights through procedural
mechanisms.2 22 The opposite is true of arbitration. 223 Arbitration's goals of
speed and efficiency are therefore inconsistent with a strict adherence to or
219 See Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp., 322 F. Supp. 278, 281
(E.D. La. 1971).
220 See Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204, 220 (Cal. 1994) (Baxter, J., dissenting).
Justice Baxter observes that most courts assume that all disputes subjected to arbitration
will be resolved with greater speed, less cost, and increased satisfaction for all the
parties involved, none of which could be provided by traditional litigation. But he goes
on to call this assumption "insupportable" because it "overlooks the thousands of
individuals who, but for arbitration provisions inserted into employment agreements,
consumer contracts, bank customer agreements, leases, and other contracts, would
resolve their disputes at much less cost and more quickly in small claims court, and in
many cases in municipal or superior court." Id.
221 See Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 1. Professor Stipanowich observes that an
"arbitrator's judgment is a formidable impediment to [an] appeal and a spur to getting
on with business." Id. But if the vanquished party in every securities arbitration
proceeding had the option of an appeal, arbitration would cease to function as a "spur to
getting on with business."
222 The Framers of the Constitution feared speed and efficiency in the processes of
government. With regards to the legislature, for instance, Alexander Hamilton, writing
in The Federalist Papers as Publius, said "promptitude of decision is oftener an evil
than a benefit." Tim FEDERAuST No. 70, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P.
Fairfield ed., 1961).
223 See Fukaya Trading Co., 322 F. Supp. at 281.
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application of the rigid and sometimes formalistic due process guidelines
established by the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
But because the possibility of an arbitrary deprivation of property is
intrinsic to every award of punitive damages, those awards must comport
with constitutional guarantees of due process. Arbitral awards of punitive
damages in securities arbitration and the Fourteenth Amendment are,
therefore, incompatible (at least for the present time). As such, securities
arbitrators cannot issue awards of punitive damages with the blessing of the
Constitution, rendering the securities arbitration forum an inappropriate
context from which to issue exemplary damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Securities arbitration was once a means of resolving disputes between
broker-dealers and their customers and employees in a swift, inexpensive,
and generally just manner that still accorded the parties the finality of
litigation. But securities arbitrators gave that process an entirely new suit of
clothes when they began to issue awards of punitive damages against the
people and firms seated across from them at the arbitration table.
Fearing that arbitral awards of exemplary damages might lead to
inequitable deprivations of property, the New York Court of Appeals for a
time attempted to preclude the practice with its declaration of the Garrity
rule, premised on the ground that punishment of wrongdoing is seated
within the exclusive authority of the state. Some of the federal circuits
followed suit, but others went in their own direction. After securities firms
seized upon the Garrity rule as a means of limiting their exposure to
punitive damage awards by arbitrators, the Supreme Court, without
establishing the suitability of punitive damage awards to the arbitration
context, enforced an arbitral award of punitive damages against a securities
dealer that had entered into an agreement containing a New York choice-
of-law clause. Thereafter, a flood of scholarly commentary and proposals
for the reform of securities arbitration muddled its landscape.
But running through this quagmire is the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Because this provision precludes any state actor from
arbitrarily depriving another of property without due process of law, they
are applicable to securities arbitrators. The actions of securities arbitrators
constitute state action to the extent that securities firms are required by
federal law to become members of the NASD. The NASD, in turn, which
itself acts upon a delegation of authority from the SEC and the Congress,
then requires securities dealers to arbitrate all disputes with customers;
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hence, securities arbitration constitutes state action and securities
arbitrators, state actors. Thus, securities arbitrators must adhere to the
exacting procedural standards established by the Supreme Court.
Unwavering conformity with due process guidelines, however, is
inconsistent with the goals of arbitration and persons' motivation to enter
arbitration. Therefore, until there exists some means of reconciling the two,
punitive damage awards remain an unacceptable and constitutionally
improper component of the securities arbitration process.

